A fly on the wall
Sipho M Pityana takes a look at the new South African government from all sides of the political spectrum
The outcome of the 2024 elections landed President Cyril Ramaphosa an opportunity to play to his celebrated strength of being a skillful negotiator. He acquitted himself and his party very well, tactically outmanoeuvring and often dividing his opponents, and landing the ANC the position of leader of society that it was denied by the electorate.
He publicly acknowledged the ANC’s electoral setback. Humbled himself in accepting that his party could no longer govern alone. His message of uniting the country and driving a common agenda in the best interests of the people resonated with both the nation and the majority of political parties. He effectively employed the language of a Government of National Unity (GNU) to skillfully build an ANC minority government. His mission of unifying the country was in stark contrast to that of his strongest protagonists in the main opposition parties, including the Democratic Alliance (DA), the Mkhonto we Sizwe Party (MKP), and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). These are the impressions of this fly on the wall.
The DA
The DA sees itself as the only alternative to the ANC. They are convinced that their strategy for the ultimate takeover has been well choreographed in both the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape Province. In the former, the party rode on the support of smaller opposition parties which it duly abandoned as soon as it didn’t need them. That became its blueprint to ultimate power, selling the notion of efficient and effective governance wherever they are in power with a few exceptions, they believe.
They lost sight of an undercurrent of resentment for their insensitivity to the imperatives of redress and transformation and, in particular, dealing with the persistence of marginalisation of Africans after so many years of freedom. This accounts for the fact that it has plateaued in its growth trajectory and receded in the latest elections.
As far as the DA was concerned, the ANC had lost an election and it needed it to co-govern the country in what was a first phase in their ultimate plan to takeover government. Mistakenly, it saw a leader in Ramaphosa who had been so weakened by the deep internal divisions in his party, including the new breakaway MKP, that he would see his salvation in forging alliances outside of it.
The DA’s hurried abandonment of its opportunistically concocted Moonshot Pact (MP) was more than just the fact that together, these opposition parties couldn’t garner a majority in parliament, but importantly about what the DA perceived to be an opportunity to snatch power from a seemingly weak, demoralised, and desperate ANC.
If you can assert your hegemony at the main table, why fiddle on the fringes with what they perceived as minions; so they thought. By jumping in first, the DA sought to wrestle the strategic initiative from the ANC, hoping to set the terms of engagement and gate keep.
After all, it was always clear that it wouldn’t work with the EFF and MKP and that all the other parties were to be “favoured guests” in what they construed as a DA/ANC love affair.
The MKP
On the other hand, the next most powerful party, the MKP, was too busy rolling out its predetermined agenda to discredit the election and cast doubt on the legitimacy of the electoral outcomes, and therefore government, as a prelude to pursuing its destabilisation agenda. They
suffered setbacks at every turn and denied themselves a place at the table to influence the shape and character of the GNU.
They had opened too many fronts in their battle with negligible capacity to follow through. They declared war on what they called ‘Ramaphosa’s ANC’, which could only mean that they wouldn’t be able to work with that party. They had nothing positive to say about the IEC. They consistently argued even before voting that if the election outcome showed them at less than a two thirds majority, it would only be due to the rigging of the vote.
Like their leader Jacob Zuma, they have in Chief Justice Raymond Zondo a sworn enemy that they consider incapable of honouring his calling to the bench. The rest of the judiciary is credible only when it rules in their favour, otherwise it’s assumed hostile and partisan. They are avowedly against the Constitution, the rule of law, and some important values that define our society today.
The MKP, which had consistently put the ANC on the back foot since its breakaway only six months before the elections, lost a unique opportunity to present Ramaphosa with a political dilemma. After all, it played no small part in the ANC’s almost 30% decline in electoral support at the 2024 polls. There were strong voices within the ANC, to whom a relationship with the DA is anathema, who were pushing very hard for an ANC/MKP/EFF reunion.
MKP suffered delusions of grandeur arising from its incredible electoral performance in the short time it was established. Even more so, its exceptional performance in KZN and the humiliation of the ANC in that province, combined with the erosion of the growing EFF support and undercutting the electoral fortunes of the IFP, made it a force to reckoned with.
Although the MKP engaged in the GNU talks with the ANC, it did so assuming the former’s desperation and sought to use this to insist on its unilaterally determined terms to which the ANC would never have been able to agree. It failed to use such engagements to shift the dynamics in the ANC against Ramaphosa.
Simultaneously, the MKP was too pre-occupied with governing KZN where it assumed it would be in charge as if a foregone conclusion. By supporting the IFP to lead that province in a coalition that also included the DA and National Freedom Party (NFP), Ramaphosa successfully sidestepped a direct confrontation with the MKP. Even more importantly, MKP’s ability to play the tribal card was severely circumscribed.
The EFF
Similarly, the EFF as the fourth largest party and a significant player at almost 10% of the National Assembly (NA), lost a strategic opportunity to insert itself to power and reposition itself for the ultimate takeover from the ANC, which is its widely known strategy.
Like the MKP, it had an exaggerated sense of its power and influence to direct the terms of post election political landscape. This stemmed from its confidence about what it understood to be internal dynamics in the ANC.
What makes the EFF’s loss from these elections greater than that of any other party is the collapse of its widely discussed, but unconfirmed grand takeover plan. Without commenting on its authenticity or otherwise; the EFF is said to have been working with the dominant faction in the Gauteng ANC to ensure the latter’s continued governance of that province after 2024 elections in exchange for strategic roles for the EFF at national level.
An EFF that was confident of its electoral prospects thought it would be in a strong enough position to co-govern with the ANC. Emboldened by the ascendance of Paul Mashatile at the 2022 ANC’s Elective Conference to the position of Deputy President of that party and subsequently the country, their plan seemed achievable.
In this scenario, there was more to the deal than just the ANC’s retention of a province that is the country’s economic hub; its most destabilising dimension was to be the removal of Ramaphosa as the country’s President. This would see Mashatile take over his role with EFF’s Julius Malema assuming the Deputy President role and hence the punting of the Ministry of Finance role for Floyd Shivambu.
This perhaps explains the EEF’s rather strident personal attacks on Ramaphosa during the election campaign and their frontal insistence at the time that they might work only with the ANC, but not with him, a stance that the newly formed MKP adopted with ease. It was only after their electoral fortunes fell short that the EFF proclaimed their readiness to serve under Ramaphosa’s leadership.
By projecting the GNU as a sellout project to a white racist DA, the EFF was seeking to sow division within the ANC in order to scupper Ramaphosa’s initiative and thereby regain its lost strategic influence, especially after being relegated by the MKP. The EFF was so confident that the ANC’s special National Executive Committee (NEC) convened to discuss the GNU and would join them in rejecting any deal that involved the DA. In the end, that failed, but not for lack of trying.
Had it succeeded, Ramaphosa would have not only suffered a humiliating setback in his own party, but even worse the ANC would possibly have been plunged into an even deeper crisis and led by a severely wounded general in its fiercest battle for survival.
All along, the EFF’s agenda, like the DA, was to co-govern with the ANC and possibly others, including the MKP, in what they considered the dying days of the ANC, where they would ultimately emerge wearing the crown.
Unlike the DA, they thought by staying out of the GNU they could kill it, and persuade those they considered like-minded (or as they call them, ‘the progressives’) to do the same. Consequently, they thought they would leave the ANC with a dilemma of having to explain its marriage with the DA against an available option of “progressive” parties. In this way, they had hoped to earn themselves a place at the main table to determine the terms of a co-government with the ANC and invited “others”. They, like the DA, would be gatekeepers while ensuring their hegemony.
All welcome
By framing the guiding principles of a GNU and its terms of engagement while simultaneously remaining expressly open to engage with everyone, Ramaphosa created an impression of an open door, but in fact it was more about exclusion by self elimination.
Unlike the EFF and the DA that were exclusive, albeit in varying ways, the ANC presented itself to other parties as inclusive.
Although the IFP was early in joining the GNU, and a strategic partner given the KZN dynamics, the DA was quite keen to contain its significance more to that province than national, which it saw as the preserve of the big girls (DA and ANC). The ANC’s open door approach brought with it the dilution of the DA’s positioning and the strengthening of the ANC.
Hand Overplayed
There can be little doubt that all three major opposition parties underestimated Ramaphosa and the ANC and consequently overplayed their cards, thereby unintentionally affording him a rite of passage.
In overplaying its hand, the DA inflicted the most severe damage to its standing, including amongst its most loyal support base. Their arrogance, which Ramaphosa rightly described as “condescending”, alienated many more.
They misunderstood the fact that many powerful among its funders wanted it to be in coalition with the ANC, not so much in order to co-govern, but, critically, to prevent an ANC reunion with the EFF and MKP.
They perceived such a prospect of reunion as a threat to political and economic stability as it could possibly result in a shift to economic policies.
Very few among these were looking to the DA to tame the ANC’s economic policies. After all, the latter is already doing a good job of that with its conservative agenda, unaided.
With their original game plan having failed dismally, the DA leaders are already publicly contradicting each other, no longer sure why they are in the GNU.
This fly on the wall believes that the DA does not have an option but to stay in the GNU, as quitting will exert a much higher price than joining in the first instance. Work it out; that’s what keeps an unhappy marriage going.
Similarly, the EFF, which has a lot more in common with the ANC than it does with the MKP, has a serious dilemma. In the absence of a clearly articulated policy statement, not only is the MKP against a constitutional order, their policy statements are often at variance with the foundational principles of the Freedom Charter, by which the EFF swears. Beyond a dislike for Ramaphosa, there is nothing obvious about their possible alliance. However, marriages of convenience are all too common in politics, so we cannot be surprised.
The party of red overalls unfortunately does not have too many options. A deep introspection might just help them discover the many different overall colours that feel left out in their cause.
A Cry for Leadership
Coalitions are sustainable only in conditions where leadership shows maturity and have a realistic sense, not only of their relative strength in relations to other parties to the arrangement, but also the select circumstances when such strength may be effectively deployed. Ramaphosa may have won this round, but that is no guarantee of how he would fare in future ones.
Bigger battles lie ahead as some in the coalition wrongly assume that they may be able to pursue their exclusive party positions. The early ructions that have resulted in delays in the announcement of a Government of Provincial Unity (GPU) and the IFP/NFP differences in KZN are all signs that we dare not be euphoric. After all, unity is what we aspire for, but the absence of a single hegemonic party means the political space stands to be fiercely contested.
In the meantime, the country is in desperate need of cohesive and decisive leadership that can urgently take it out of its worsening crises. The GNU’s minimum programme suggests a recognition of where urgent action is required.
The inevitable political squabbles that are likely to follow the swearing-in of the new executive should not cost us the necessary focus and a sense of urgency to follow through on the minimum programme.
While all the parties to the GNU have a duty to ensure its success, there can be no doubt that the three most significant players to ensure the success of this initiative are the ANC, DA, and the IFP.
They must be reminded that national interests trump narrow party political agenda. 
Sipho M Pityana